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Résumé
Ce papier propose, sous forme d’un ensemble de logiciels, une
analyse critique des modèles théoriques agrégés. Il s’agit de
construire un modèle totalement désagrégé, lequel est ensuite
validé par expérimentations, puis d’effectuer une comparai-
son entre les simulations agrégées et désagrégées. Le mod-
èle désagrégé repose en effet sur un algorithme totalement
analogique des comportements individuels ce qui rend possible
sa validation par expérimentation. L’application présentée ici
porte sur la formation des prix en concurrence imparfaite (ab-
sence de transparence) et l’expérimentation est proposée dans
un contexte scolaire. Enfin, l’implémentation informatique de
cette analyse permet, d’une certaine manière, de relancer le
débat Mises-Hayek-Lange à propos du socialisme de marché.
Summary
The purpose of this paper is, through a system of software, to
analyze some theoretical aggregate models. We suggest to build
a disaggregated model to compare its results with these of the
aggregated one. The disaggregated model uses an analogical
mechanism of the individual behaviors so that a validation of
it by experiments is possible. We apply the system to the mech-
anism of prices and we do experiments at school, which unable
the Mises-Hayek-Lange debate to be reconsidered through the
computer implementation of its system.
Mots-clés : Économie expérimentale, Modélisation, Simula-
tion, Marché, Logiciels économiques
Key Words : Experimental Economics, Modelling, Simula-
tion, Market, Economic Softwares
JEL Classification : B53, C15, C88, C90
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0 - Introduction
Experimental method in economics is often presented as a complementary
method for the econometric one. We don’t use econometric one here, but we
try1 to combine three complementary analysis levels - see Fig.#1. At the first
level we found an aggregated theoretical model, a disaggregated model is at
second one. The third level is an experimental one (we built an exchange
software)2. Our purpose is to compare the results of a disaggregated model,
which would be chosen by experiment, with the results of an aggregated one.
Fig.#1 - Theoretical, empirical, and experimental system
Because our disaggregated model is built according to an analogical pro-
cess of exchange behaviors, we think that experimental methods are able to
validate it3. Experiments help us to choose the right disaggregated model
among a lot of potential one. When we examine general literature about
algorithms4 (simulation or optimization one), we can observe that an ana-
logical process is seldom used. If we except the commercial traveller, queue
or dynamic programming algorithms, the differential criteria of the optimiza-
1- In a preliminary working paper for a macroeconomic Doctorate thesis (R.Buda,
1997), we examine the difficulties of the behavior equations and our temporary conclusion
was that we have to formalize analogical equations. So, we have considered the aggregated
level was not compatible with such a formalization.
2- We have built all the system with the language Turbo-Pascal 7.0.
3- This reflection is born during the redaction of our Doctorate thesis (the main purpose
of this thesis was to build a macro-econometric modelling software for multi-dimensional
models, and so to study the relationship between algorithms and real behaviors in the mar-
kets). The idea was reinforced too by some teaching experiments in high school (R.Buda,
1998).
4- The H.Scarf (1967) algorithm belongs to aggregated algorithms, but it is more applied
than others one. It opens the way for Computable General Equilibrium Models.
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tion algorithms (gradients, etc.) don’t indeed describe the behavior of the
economic agents.
We have applied here our method to the price mechanism. We assume
a market with only one good (in the disaggregated model, but eight in the
market experiment) without any production - agents are consumers, sellers,
or dealers only5. In this paper, we’ll describe the stages of the building
of the system and some applications of the disaggregated model, but not
experimental results yet6. We’ll then be able to examine some theoretical
problems (price mechanism, "market socialism").
1 - The Price Mechanism Theoretical Model
The new-classical model is based on the price mechanism. Under some
assumptions, it describes pure and perfect competition. Here, we tried to
build an algorithm to resolve an exchange problem and then, we tried to
compare its results with the theoretical equilibrium results (in the case of a
partial equilibrium).
Tab#1 - Total number list of buyers and sellers for each price
Total number Total number Total number
Price of potential of potential
purchases sales
P0 A0 V0
P1 A1 V1
P2 A2 V2
...
...
...
Pn An Vn
1.1 - Theory and Price Mecanism
The assumption we particularly examine, is the transparency one. Con-
sumers and sellers are supposed rational. That means each consumer and
5- We’ll have to leave this assumption, and we’ll have to resolve a programming difficult
; with this assumption we are not able to consider the substitutions effect between goods.
6- The experiment with pupils at high school was delayed because of troubles with our
network system.
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seller (resp.) knows his maximum purchase price and minimum sale price
(resp.) - we speak about "psychological price" in commercial management.
They have access neither concerning difficulties nor costs, to the information
necessary for their transactions. According to static analysis7, we assume
that an auctioneer announces some prices until the number of demanders is
equal to the suppliers on - "equilibrium". We often read in literature, that
at each price some of them make a contract, but in the same time some
others break their previous contract. Such a contract process is not right
from a legal point of view8. Well, in the experimental method we consider
the role of institutions. The behavior of auctioneer is one of "tâtonnement",
that means he increases or decreases (resp.) the prices when he observes an
excess of demand or supply (resp.). We assume we can obtain the level of
each side of the market (Demand and Supply) by aggregation (with a simple
addition). In fact, such an assumption implies that each agent is able to
meet all the others.
1.2 - Price Mechanism and Algorithm
According to the new-classical model, we have built a first algorithm to
calculate the equilibrium point of a market with one good. Our algorithm is
simulating a kind of auction.
Fig.#2 - Price mechanism algorithm
We don’t keep the behavior pattern which we described at § 1.1 (increase
and decrease movements with which auctioneer obtains equilibrium). We
consider the auctioneer regularly increases ("english auction") prices from a
7- We don’t speak about dynamic analysis (i.e. Cobweb algorithm), even if we can
explain some cyclical phenomenon.
8- In fact, who’s breaking contract must pay damages to the other side, because it is an
unilateral breach - see by e.g. E.Gaudemet, Théorie générale des obligations, Paris, Sirey,
1937.
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"bottom price". At each price, algorithm compares the number of deman-
ders to the number of suppliers. In fact, we are not always able to reach
perfect equilibrium (equality of the both sides total numbers). Hence, our
algorithm considers that equilibrium is the point where the market minimizes
the difference between both numbers - see Fig.#29.
In fact, the market holds intrinsic social information - see Tab.#1. The
new-classical model of pure and perfect competition asserts that this infor-
mation is revealed by an auctioneer process (auctioneer, advertising, etc.), so
that no transaction can take place outside the equilibrium. We know, with
the result of experimental economics, there are a lot of transactions outside
equilibrium point without any auctioneer process. Moreover, there are two
grounds on which to consider a disaggregated scale of analysis. First, the
conditions of validity of the Brower theorem (the continuity of the functions)
are not filled - there is not always a price between two successive prices. Sec-
ondly, the Sonnenschein’s theorem about the aggregation restriction10 lead
us to examine the market mechanism before any data aggregation.
2 - An Empirical Disaggregated Model - SINGUL
SINGUL is a imperfect competition market (without any auctioneer pro-
cess) price and quantity calculation model. Its algorithm is analogical be-
cause it is built from the most realistic (as possible) behavior of the agents
of a market. Our model simulates the meeting between the agents. Each
agent is able to meet a limited number of other agents11, and doesn’t know
the whole information about his market12. He is able, in a price interval, to
negociate prices to make them increase or decrease (resp.) if he sells or buys
(resp.) the good.
9- Where Inc0=Price Increment between MinPrice and MaxPrice. Diff=Absolute dif-
ference between Supply and Demand at the ith rank. We keep temporary the price in
EquPrice (Equilibrium Price) if Diff is less than MinDiff. As soon as we reach Max-
Price, the equilibrium quantity (EquQuan) become equal to the smallest value between
Supply(rank) and Demand(rank).
10- H.Sonnenschein, "Do Walras Identity and Continuity Characterize the Class of Com-
munity Excess Demand ?", Journal of Economic Theory, N˚ 6, 1973.
11- Even if agent uses new communication tools, this number of contacts is not propor-
tional to the size of the market - see M.Polanyi (1951, in french edition 1989, pp.148–77).
The limitation is not a technical one but a physiological one.
12- See F.A.Hayek (1976, in french edition 1981, pp.129–59).
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2.1 - Description of the Basic Model
SINGUL is a very short period model with only one good. The agents
can’t stock quantity of this good over the level they indeed need. So, they
can’t speculate. SINGUL simulates the behavior of the N total number
of agents. For each agent SINGUL calculates13 the initial patrimony (1),
initial present stock (2), wished stock14 (3), "mind price"15 - it’s a kind of
hidden price : if the agent wants to buy the good, he won’t pay more than
a maximum price ; if the agent wants to sell the good, he won’t to be paid
less than a minimum price - (4) and (5), and the negociation margin which
determines the interval of transaction.
Patrimti = Patrim
0
i (1)
Stock_Courantti = Stock_Courant
0
i (2)
Stock_Desireti = Stock_Desire
0
i (3)
Prix_Maxi = Prix_Maxi (4)
Prix_Mini = Prix_Mini (5)
Margei = Margei (6)
The i-th agent meets a total number of Pi other agents. Their ranks are
selected by random choice among N − 1 ranks. The i-th agent negociates
the price of one unit of the good. At the begining of the simulation, if
the difference ∆t
i
= Stock_Courantt
i
− Stock_Desiret
i
is negative, positive
(resp.) then the agent is seller, buyer (resp.). When the difference becomes
equal to zero, then the agent leaves the market.
During the negociation (9,10) between the two agents i-th and j-th, they
won’t be motivated with the same strength. One of the both agents, who has
got the greater difference (∆t), will accept the price condition of the other
agent more easily. But the conclusion of transaction happens only if the price
belongs to both negociation intervals (12 to 17). Neither agent knows the
negociation margin of his partner.
∆ti = Stock_Courant
t
i − Stock_Desire
t
i (7)
∆tj = Stock_Courant
t
j − Stock_Desire
t
j (8)
αti,j =
|∆tj |
|∆ti|+ |∆
t
j |
(9)
13- We use sometimes pseudo-random procedures.
14- It’s a kind of cardinal utility index. For J.C.HARSANYI (1956), cardinal utilities
are better than ordinal one, in the bargaining mechanism analysis.
15- Each agent is exclusively buyer or seller during a simulation session.
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if
Prix_MaxAcheteur < Prix_MinV endeur
then
Prixti,j = α
t
i,j .P rix
t
i + (1− α
t
i,j).P rix
t
j (10)
else
Prixti,j = ψ.Prix
t
i + (1− ψ).P rix
t
j (11)
ψ = 0
or
ψ = 1
Prixti.(1−Margei) ≤ Prixi,j (12)
Prixtj .(1−Margej) ≥ Prixi,j (13)
∆i < 0 (i buyer) and ∆j > 0 (j seller)
Prixti = Prix_Maxi (14)
Prixtj = Prix_Minj (15)
∆i > 0 (i seller) and ∆j < 0 (j buyer)
Prixti = Prix_Mini (16)
Prixtj = Prix_Maxj (17)
We have considered too that, sometimes the price order was not a normal
order - i.e. the minimum price of the seller is less than the maximum price
of the buyer. In this case, we assumed that only one of the two agents (he
is randomly chosen) understands that the price order is abnormal. So he
agrees with the price condition of the other, because it’s more interesting for
him than his own. This case could lead us to examine later the negociation
under the ultimatum game point of view16.
Thus, in the basic model, the agents try to reach a "level aim", (increase
or decrease their good stock level) under constraints (BuyerMaxPrice, Seller-
MinPrice and NegociationMargin)17. During a simulation session, we assume
16- There is a relationship between negociation and discrete representation of agent in
an economy - see J.Neumann (Von), O.Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic
Behavior, New Jersey, Princeton UP, 1944. About experimental games and ultimata, see
J.Ochs et A.Roth (1989).
17- We have replace the program MaxU under income constraints with the program
Min|Sc − Sd| under income constraints - Sc and Sd (resp.) for present stock and wished
stock (resp.). M.Abdel-Fadil (La planification des prix en économie socialiste - essai
méthodologique, Paris, PUF, 1975) used level stocks information in a centralizing pro-
gram because prices didn’t exist on the supply side. For a price model survey, see R.
Courbis (1977) too.
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one agent can meet enough other agents to reach his aim and to leave the
market - see algorithm in Fig.#3.
Fig.#3 - Random transactions calculation algorithm
2.2 - Some Variants of the Basic Model
If we leave the level aim assumption, we can admit that the i-th agent
tries to choose the best partner (the cheapest seller or the most generous
buyer) among all of the Pi agents he has met. The agents try to reach a
"price aim". In such a case, we need more periods of simulation than in the
first one.
During simulation, i-th agent meets Pi partners (their rank is selected by
random choice) and he makes a classification from the best to the worse18. If
the j-th agent is selected by i-th, the transaction will be concluded only if in
the mind of the j-th agent, the i-th agent is his best partner too19. We have to
consider a symmetric relationship (i, j) and (j, i) to avoid being paradoxical
: with a total random procedure we would obtain that i would meet j but j
wasn’t met by i. So we have used a contiguity matrix20 - see Fig.#4. That
18- In Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (Cambridge UP, 1960),
P.Sraffa assumed through a new-ricardian analysis, that consumers make classification of
the sellers.
19- The have to simulate a symmetric relationship We have used a contiguity matrix to
record the relationship (i, j) and (j, i) to organize comparisons on the both sides.
20- Such mathematical tool is used in regional economics to respect borders constraints
- see J.R.Boudeville, Aménagement du territoire et polarisation, Paris, M.T.Génin, 1972,
pp.46–54, or H.Jayet, Analyse spatiale quantitative, Paris, Economica, 1993, pp.7–9.
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matrix is used to keep classification too. So prices are reservation prices ;
they become real prices if the couple (i, j) is optimal for both sides. Then
both agents leave the market temporarily during the other negociations.
Fig.#4 - Contiguity and transactions matrix structure21
The exchange system is solved at the first level, when all the couples of
agents i and j, who have drawn up contract are so that i has chosen j at first
and j has chosen i at first. We write the couple is a (1,1) one. But we can
solve the exchange system on a second level too. That means that we keep
first all the couples (1,1), and then all the couples (1,2) & (2,1). We solve
the exchange system on a third level, when we keep the (1,1), then (1,2) &
(2,1), and at last the (1,3), (3,1), (3,2), (2,3), (3,3) couples. We can solve the
system until the Pith level, but the agents who drawn up contracts at such
a level are less useful than those who have found partners at the first level22.
The following equations of the model are :
Prixti,j =
h=1
inf
Pi−r
(Prixtj,h) (18)
Prixtj,i =
k=1
sup
Pj−r′
(Prixti,k) (19)
21- As we select the rank of the Pi partenaires of the i-th agent, we put the number 1
at the row of the partner at i-th line and, in the same time, we put the number 1 at the
i-th row at the partner line. We put the number 0 elsewhere.
22- That means too that these agents was perhaps to much demanding.
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r =
Rang(j)
∈ Ci
(20)
r′ =
Rang(i)
∈ Cj
(21)
where the i-th price (a reservation price) is the best that the Pi partners
have proposed to him at level r (r′ for seller) - i and j belong to a (r, r′)
couple. However, after one period, some agents don’t find a partner because
of their best price aim. So, we have assumed that they make their transaction
conditions weak. We examine two cases : 1˚ - they make their negociation
margin weak ; 2˚ - they increase their partners number (Pi), it means they
buy information - see the algorithm at Fig.#5.
Chart#1 - Satisfaction interval during price negociation23
To analyze the results at the end of simulation, we have tried to define
a welfare index for each agent. If an agent has found a partner, we have
considered that he could reach two extreme kinds of situation. We can admit
the following convention. If the transaction price P ∗ is just at the border of
his negociation margin price - ma or mv (resp.) if he is buyer or seller (resp)
-, then his satisfaction is minimal. If P ∗ is just equal to his own mind price -
BuyerMaxPrice or SellerMinPrice (resp.) if he is buyer or seller (resp) - then
his satisfaction is maximal24.
23- This Chart is analogous to the chart of utilities in the bargaining analysis. We
can observe that this analysis was more interesting by utilities than the price movements
through the bargaining mechanism - see e.g. A.Coddington (1968).
24- We consider here the case of normal order prices.
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when i is buyer
Si = 1−
(
Prixti,j − P0
P100 − P0
)
(22)
with
{
P100 = Prix_Maxi
P0 = Prix_Maxi.(1 +Margei)
(23)
when i is seller
Si =
(
Prixti,j − P0
P100 − P0
)
(24)
with
{
P100 = Prix_Mini
P0 = Prix_Mini.(1−Margei)
(25)
with i = 1 to N and j = 1 to Pi.
We have defined the Satisfaction index25 Sa or Sv (resp.) of the buyer or
the seller (resp.) as the difference between P∗ and mind price divided by the
difference between mind price increased or decreased (resp.) with negociation
margin - see Chart#1 and equations (22 to 24).
Fig.#5 - Best price transactions calculation algorithm
25- About this point, J.Marchal (1969, pp.109–13) speaks of "rente du consommateur"
(vs "producteur").
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In Appendix 6.3 we can find the cohesion tests about the behavior simu-
lation. The next part describes the method we’ll want to use to validate the
SINGUL model. The solution of the SINGUL model is not an aggregated
one, so we have to use a disaggregated tool - the experimental one.
In fact, we consider, the theoretical modelling tries to get endogenous
most variables of a phenomenon, and on the contrary, experimental method
tries to get them exogenous (it’s even an interactive exogenezsation one).
3 - Market Experiments with the "ÉCHANGE" Software
Market experiment - as false or real situations where some agents are
playing goods supplier and demander games - has existed for a long time -
let’s think about the financial markets, the fish market auctions, etc. The
ECHANGE software we’ll present now, explores the imperfect competition
problem26.
3.1 - The Experimental Way in Economics
The experimental method is born because on the one hand, economists
attempted to abandon perfect assumptions of competition market, and on
the other hand, the game theory was applied to economics and manage-
ment27. We can observe that experimental method has taken place in the
teaching context too28 - or firms game context29. The background game is
often a microeconomic one, but we can imagine a macroeconomic one too30.
With such software, the pedagogical advantage is to show the mechanism of
economic models to the pupils, and the experimental advantage is to collect
data about economic policy decisions31 (R.Buda, 1998).
26- One of the main problem already examined by the experiment pioneer :
E.H.CHAMBERLIN, in "An Experimental Imperfect Market", Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 56, 1948, pp.95–108.
27- O.Morgenstern examined the problem of the experiment in economics - see A.Schotter
(Ed.) (1976).
28- The Journal of Economic Education has published some experimental teaching pa-
pers : R.B.Williams, Y.De Young & J.M.Leuthold in 1993 ; N.Netusil & M.J.Haupert in
1995 ; M.J.Haupert in 1996. See in French literature F.Gagey & P.Rey (1986).
29- MIT has developed some management simulation softwares - see e.g. A.E.Amstutz
(1967).
30- By e.g., in the French literature see M.Pariset & J.M.Albertini, (Jeux et initiation
économique, Paris, CNRS, 1980) or M.Berthot & S.Guillaumont-Jeanneney (Trois jeux
informatiques de politique économique, Paris, Cujas, 1977) ; in the English literature see
M.Binks & A.Jennings (Macroeconomics in focus, London, McGrawHill, 1986) who exam-
ines rational expectations.
31- We collect data about the question "what would you do if you were chancellor ?".
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The experimental data32 has got interesting characteristics to lead a "ce-
teris paribus" analysis, but we have to make some corrections33 before any
interpretation. It does exist an analogy but no identity between reality and
experiment. It becomes possible to lead a double complementary method
(econometric and experimental one)34. However, in our system (see Fig.#1),
there is no econometric procedure. The experimental software organizes ex-
changes and collects data to help disaggregated model choice.
According to V.L.Smith (1989), the choice of environment and institu-
tions by the economists is the main advantage of experiment in comparison to
the econometrics method. The experimental protocol is defined by five prin-
ciples : 1˚ - insatiability - the utility function of each agent is a monotonous
function of his gains ; 2˚ - prominence - the gains of each agent depend on
the actions of the other ; 3˚ - dominance - the reward motivates each agent
; 4˚ - secret - each agent only knows his owns information ; 5˚ - parallelism -
laboratory institution has to look like the real world we try to represent.
3.2 - Description of an Experimental Economics Software - "ECHANGE"
ECHANGE software can (will be able to) run under two modes on a
network system. The teacher e.g., can lead the system with the pilot mode
and his pupils (or students) use operator mode - see Fig.#6 - but the pilot
is not an auctioneer.
Fig.#6 - ECHANGE software algorithms
32- The data we obtain in situ are called field-happenstance-data ; the other are the
laboratory-happenstance-data.
33- It exists some econometric procedures to obtain better data (R.Deloche, 1995).
34- We can correct specification mistake. About a general point of view, see
O.Morgenstern (op.cit.). See R.J.Lalonde (1986) too.
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ECHANGE software simulates the transactions : the operator nor really
buys the goods neither do these goods really exist. The exchanges take place
over a short period (we assume a daily period) and the goods have been
chosen among the leisure of the pupils - parallelism principle - see Fig.#7.
Each operator exists for the other one through his advertisement(s). At each
period, the operator can write advertisements and/or answer to one (to buy
and/or sell), and/or buy goods at hypermarkets. They have to pay for infor-
mation (advertisements, hypermarket prices) - principle of secret. We have
used the hypermarkets to give a reference price of the goods - parallelism
principle. At each period, ECHANGE simulates hypermarkets out of stock,
very early - we want to avoid operators only buying at hypermarkets - prin-
ciple of parallelism too. The goal of each operator (pupils) is to maximize
his utility (in buying or selling some goods) with his liquid assets. Before
the exchanges, each operator answers to a questionnaire to define his util-
ity function (proportions of goods to hold at each period). Initial dotations
of goods are calculated to present an excess quantity of one good, so that
all operators would be sellers of one good, at least. There is no point in
the operators speculating because they don’t realize their periodical aim -
prominence principle. ECHANGE software calculates the classification of
the operators at each period - insatiability and dominance principles -, and
at the end of game - it considers the final level of liquid assets too.
3.3 - The Perspectives with "ECHANGE" software
We’ll are able to collect some important data (prices, levels, periodicity
of some behavior, compatibility aims and decisions, information purchases,
hypermarket purchases, etc.). One of the problems which could happen is the
use of advertisements. The operators will think easily of writing advertise-
ments for sales, but they don’t think of writing when they want to buy. This
problem would imply some difficulties collecting buyers prices. If we don’t
have both side’s prices, the comparison with models would be impossible. It
will probably be impossible to observe a "best price search" behavior, because
operators are constraint to have a quantity level aim. Another problem is to
allow the operator to choose among the partners who answer to him by an
auction - it’s just a programming problem. In a next release of ECHANGE,
we could implement a free rider procedure - after a transaction, one of the
operators obtains some more money. We could ask the operator what be the
prices are they expect for the goods for the next period. The main goal of
the interpretation of data will be to calculate the gap in the equilibrium ; it
will be more difficult to estimate the "mind prices", the negociation margins
and the partners classification behaviors of the operators.
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4 - Market, Planning, and Calculation: a Temporary Conclusion
When we are writing this paper, the experiment is not applied to choose
a good version of the disaggregated model SINGUL. We are not able to con-
clude either the comparison or about the experiment but we hope from it, to
know more about information search behaviors and the market coordination
assumption. We know the transparency assumption is a controversial point.
For new-keynesians R.W.Clower & A.Leijonhufvud35 , the agents make non
optimal decisions because of a lack of information. For F.A.Hayek on the
contrary, there is a coordination between agents in the market because no-
body knows the "whole information" ; so agents look for a partner who is
able to give him complementary information36. However, we can present
some reflections about the building of economic algorithms (especially ana-
logical ones) and their properties in representing economic reality. When we
have to build a disaggregated model, there are new problems we don’t have
to resolve in comparison to aggregated ones37. The exactness of the method
depends on the solution of such a problem38.
Our system only presents exchange models (without production), but we
can reconsider here the Mises-Hayek-Lange debate39. With all necessary in-
formation and a very efficient computer, is a Planning administrator able
to take place of each agent to calculate their optimal decisions - L.Mises
explains us it’s impossible and for F.A.Hayek, he is necessarily inefficient ?
So O.R.Lange proposed decentralizing planning40 which controled only in-
35- "The Coordination of Economic Activities", American Economic Review, Vol.65,
1975, pp.182–88.
36- The coordination assumption is a controversial point even in Austrian economics
school - see M. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands,
1982.
37- At the level of an aggregated firm we don’t have to check all the relationships between
all agents to be sure the system is coherent. We assume the necessarily relationship exist.
At the disaggregated level we have to check all the relationships. In national account
first, we work with aggregated data and we use some black boxes (by e.g. the "comptes
écrans") to simulate the market relationship. Secondly, the national account has not
gor the same properties like double-entry firms accounts - see O.Arkhipoff, "Importance
et diversité des problèmes d’agrégation en Comptabilité nationale", in E.Archambault &
O.Arkhipoff (EDS), La comptabilité nationale face au défi international, Paris, Economica,
1990, pp.365–81.
38- See the macro-account building of M.Allais (1954).
39- See L.Mises (Von) (1935), F.A.Hayek (Von)(Ed.) (1935), O.R.Lange (1967) and
"On the Economic Theory of Socialism", Review of Economic Studies, N˚ 4(1–2), 1936-37,
Reprint 1967.
40- O.R.Lange (1970) has worked on economics control with a cybernetical point of view
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termediate goods but the real problems of planning were never resolved41.
Because, without any prices, these economies can’t find their optimal situa-
tion, moreover, the agent keeps the information (F.A.Hayek (Ed.) (op.cit.))
to keep their power - even with decentralized planning. In fact, sometimes,
when one agent has to make a decision, his behavior depends on his envi-
ronment. If something was different in his environment, perhaps he have
made another decision. The fundamental problem is if we want to replace
agent’s behavior (with planning), we try to replace some contingent actions
by a few necessary procedures. For E.Barone (1908), it’s useless to calculate
the exchange solution that we can obtain easily by the market mechanism
without any calculation. Another point we can examine when we build algo-
rithms is the arithmetical one42. Let’s assume a planning administrator who
has access to all necessary information - it would be not enough even if the
agent gave their mind prices43. Let’s assume - with the SINGUL model - that
the population of an economy is 1,000,000, the number of different goods is
1,000, then the number of negociations would be 1013 (with 100 meetings for
each agent), and 1021 (if each agent meets the other). Two problems occur :
1˚ - the calculation duration is one month (with a 1 GHz processor) ; 2˚ - the
overflow of the twenty digits computers so we loose the accuracy of the calcu-
lation44. We know that it’s possible to correct the accuracy problem, but we
use more calculation time. Moreover, it is not necessarily more interesting to
organize a general meeting (each agent meets the other), because in this case
the number of meetings will reinforce the bad position of the less interesting
agents toward his partners (they can better make comparisons). When we’ll
collect and we’ll analyze data and then results, we’ll have to remember these
last reflections. A quantitative tool, especially a scientific one, is useful as
soon as we know its limits.
too. About decentralizing planning algorithms, see P.Picard, Procédures et modèles de la
planification décentralisée, Paris, Economica, 1979.
41- Programming technicals have make progress with the work of L.V. Kantorovitch,
but not the socialist planning.
42- O.Morgenstern (1950) speaks about calculate accuracy, the heavy quantity of equa-
tions to formalize and to resolve exchanges just for a very little economy. L.Robbins
(The Great Depression, London, Macmillan, 1934) speak about one million equations,
F.A.Hayek (Ed.)(1935, op.cit.) about a hundred millions.
43- See the conclusion of X.Freitas (1978).
44- See our working paper about the GNOMBR software (R.Buda, 1996) - e.g. we loose
accuracy from 20! calculation. we use an accuracy of 2500 digits. See M.Daumas &
J.M.Muller (Eds), Qualité des calculs sur ordinateurs - vers des arithmétiques plus fiables
?, Paris, Masson, 1997, 164 p.
18 Rodolphe Buda, GAMA-MODEM CNRS, University of Paris 10
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6 - Appendix
6.1 - Check Screen of the Program "ECHANGE"
Screen#1
Screen#2
Screen#3
Screen#4
Screen#5
Screen #1 gather data about pat-
rimonies (current inventories, liquidi-
ties) and goals (wished inventories).
Screen #2 gets information’s pur-
chase tariffs.
Screen #3 provides the hypermar-
ket’s merchandizes prices.
Screen #4 waits for the announce-
ments.
Screen #5 displays announce-
ments.
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6.2 - Description of the Market Simulation with the
"ECHANGE" software
Game session stages :
At the beginning, we ask his name and its leisures preference to each
operator (we try to install in a few different rooms to avoid any trouble
communications). We can then calculate good stock aim utility function
and initial present stocks - see Appendix 6.1.
#1 - The some information prices (Hypermarkets advertising, transport,
advertisement) are displayed (local one are free).
#2 - Operator can "write" advertisement (to buy vs sale purchases). He
can keep one message during a lot of period. Price is lower than normal
message, but he can’t change the message until of the total of period.
#3 - Operator can buy the advertisements national paper (local one is
free). After the second display of advertisements, operator has to pay.
#4 - Operator can answer to one or a lot of advertisements. Who answer
do accept to pay for transport of good. When he answer, transaction is
not warranted. Perhaps there are a lot of answers to the same advertise-
ment. The first arrived is the partner.
#5 - Operator can buy the same kind of goods in hypermarkets.
#6 - Software calculates transaction results. Then results are displayed
at each screen. Utility functions and new classification are calculated and
possibly displayed. Some parameters in the utility are implemented to
avoid the explosive classification (one operator is first and the other know
they never reach him).
In the goods file we can find the name of each one, and the reference
hypermarket price - see Fig.#7.
Fig.#7 - Hobby’s good file
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6.3 - An Example of Simulation with the "SINGUL" software
MARCHE DE 20 OPERATEURS
10 VENDEURS ET 10 ACHETEURS
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 57.6000 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 39.5000 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 20.0000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 40.0000 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5 VEN 2 41.3000 37.0000 0.320 16900.0000 5 -
6 VEN 1 50.0000 34.7000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 20.4000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 41.3000 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 23.4000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 4 48.9000 36.2000 0.390 16600.0000 5 -
11 VEN 2 54.7000 38.5000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12 ACH -1 38.4000 35.5000 0.350 18500.0000 5 -
13 VEN 3 45.9000 26.8000 0.320 18800.0000 5 -
14 ACH -4 54.7000 27.0000 0.370 17300.0000 5 -
15 ACH -2 48.9000 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 36.5000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 36.0000 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 59.2000 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 2 46.3000 39.7000 0.350 18000.0000 5 -
20 ACH -1 47.4000 22.1000 0.400 17000.0000 5 -
DELTA STOCKS 21 -23
PERIODE 1
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 38.3740 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
RESOLUTION DU MARCHE ETAPE 1 ------------------ ( 5/ 14)
36.5333 ( 13/ 12) 38.1000
FIN DES TRANSACTIONS -------
NOMBRE DE TRANSACTIONS 2
POURCENTAGE DE TRANSACTION 20.0000%
PRIX MOYEN DE TRANSACTION 37.3167 PRIX MODAL DE TRANSACTION
36.5000 DELTA STOCKS 2 -5
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5 VEN 1 41.3000 0.320 16936.5333 5 0.639
6 VEN 1 50.0000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 4 48.9000 0.390 16600.0000 5 -
11 VEN 2 54.7000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12
13 VEN 2 45.9000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14 ACH -3 27.0000 0.370 17263.4667 5 0.954
15 ACH -2 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 2 46.3000 0.350 18000.0000 5 -
20 ACH -1 22.1000 0.400 17000.0000 5 -
DELTA STOCKS 19 -21
PERIODE 2
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 34.1240 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
RESOLUTION DU MARCHE ETAPE 1 ------------------ ( 19/ 20)
30.1667
FIN DES TRANSACTIONS -------
NOMBRE DE TRANSACTIONS 1
POURCENTAGE DE TRANSACTION 10.0000%
PRIX MOYEN DE TRANSACTION 30.1667 PRIX MODAL DE TRANSACTION
30.2500 DELTA STOCKS 2 -5
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5 VEN 1 41.3000 0.320 16936.5333 5 0.639
6 VEN 1 50.0000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 4 48.9000 0.390 16600.0000 5 -
11 VEN 2 54.7000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12
13 VEN 2 45.9000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14 ACH -3 27.0000 0.370 17263.4667 5 0.954
15 ACH -2 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
M
a
rket
E
x
ch
a
n
ge
M
od
ellin
g
E
x
perim
en
t,
S
im
u
la
tio
n
A
lgo
rith
m
s,
a
n
d
T
h
eo
retica
l
A
n
a
ly
sis23
18 ACH -2 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 1 46.3000 0.350 18030.1667 5 0.004
20
DELTA STOCKS 18 -20
PERIODE 3
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 34.1240 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
RESOLUTION DU MARCHE ETAPE 1 ------------------ ( 10/ 14)
36.3857
FIN DES TRANSACTIONS -------
NOMBRE DE TRANSACTIONS 1
POURCENTAGE DE TRANSACTION 10.0000%
PRIX MOYEN DE TRANSACTION 36.3857 PRIX MODAL DE TRANSACTION
36.5000 DELTA STOCKS 2 -5
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5 VEN 1 41.3000 0.320 16936.5333 5 0.639
6 VEN 1 50.0000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 3 48.9000 0.390 16636.3857 5 0.344
11 VEN 2 54.7000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12
13 VEN 2 45.9000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14 ACH -2 27.0000 0.370 17227.0810 5 0.940
15 ACH -2 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 1 46.3000 0.350 18030.1667 5 0.004
20
DELTA STOCKS 17 -19
PERIODE 4
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 34.1240 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
RESOLUTION DU MARCHE ETAPE 1 ------------------ ( 5/ 14)
36.5333
FIN DES TRANSACTIONS -------
NOMBRE DE TRANSACTIONS 1
POURCENTAGE DE TRANSACTION 10.0000%
PRIX MOYEN DE TRANSACTION 36.5333 PRIX MODAL DE TRANSACTION
36.5000 DELTA STOCKS 2 -5
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5
6 VEN 1 50.0000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 3 48.9000 0.390 16636.3857 5 0.344
11 VEN 2 54.7000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12
13 VEN 2 45.9000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14 ACH -1 27.0000 0.370 17190.5476 5 0.954
15 ACH -2 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 1 46.3000 0.350 18030.1667 5 0.004
20
DELTA STOCKS 16 -18
PERIODE 5
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 36.4240 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
RESOLUTION DU MARCHE ETAPE 1 ------------------ ( 10/ 14)
32.4750
FIN DES TRANSACTIONS -------
NOMBRE DE TRANSACTIONS 1
POURCENTAGE DE TRANSACTION 10.0000%
PRIX MOYEN DE TRANSACTION 32.4750 PRIX MODAL DE TRANSACTION
32.2500 DELTA STOCKS 2 -5
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5
6 VEN 1 50.0000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 2 48.9000 0.390 16668.8607 5 0.139
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11 VEN 2 54.7000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12
13 VEN 2 45.9000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14
15 ACH -2 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 1 46.3000 0.350 18030.1667 5 0.004
20
DELTA STOCKS 15 -17
PERIODE 6
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 33.8740 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
RESOLUTION DU MARCHE
AUCUNE TRANSACTION -------
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5
6 VEN 1 50.0000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 2 48.9000 0.390 16668.8607 5 0.139
11 VEN 2 54.7000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12
13 VEN 2 45.9000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14
15 ACH -2 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 1 46.3000 0.350 18030.1667 5 0.004
20
DELTA STOCKS 15 -17
ETAT DES PATRIMOINES
1 ACH -2 57.6000 16.3000 0.350 19200.0000 5 -
2 ACH -3 39.5000 19.5000 0.390 17500.0000 5 -
3 VEN 2 54.5000 20.0000 0.310 17800.0000 5 -
4 ACH -4 40.0000 21.7000 0.360 19200.0000 5 -
5 XXX 0 41.3000 37.0000 0.320 16973.0667 5 0.639
6 VEN 1 50.0000 34.7000 0.310 18500.0000 5 -
7 VEN 1 49.3000 20.4000 0.350 17200.0000 5 -
8 ACH -2 41.3000 16.3000 0.380 19400.0000 5 -
9 VEN 1 53.0000 23.4000 0.350 19900.0000 5 -
10 VEN 2 48.9000 36.2000 0.390 16668.8607 5 0.139
11 VEN 2 54.7000 38.5000 0.340 16500.0000 5 -
12 XXX 0 38.4000 35.5000 0.350 18461.9000 5 0.209
13 VEN 2 45.9000 26.8000 0.320 18838.1000 5 0.469
14 XXX 0 54.7000 27.0000 0.370 17158.0726 5 0.548
15 ACH -2 48.9000 15.2000 0.370 18900.0000 5 -
16 VEN 3 51.8000 36.5000 0.340 17900.0000 5 -
17 ACH -2 36.0000 21.9000 0.310 19000.0000 5 -
18 ACH -2 59.2000 20.9000 0.310 17200.0000 5 -
19 VEN 1 46.3000 39.7000 0.350 18030.1667 5 0.004
20 XXX 0 47.4000 22.1000 0.400 16969.8333 5 0.913
DELTA STOCKS 15 -17
SATISFACTION-PRIX MOYENNE DES ACHETEURS 0.000
SATISFACTION-PRIX MOYENNE DES VENDEURS 0.204
PRIX D’EQUILIBRE 33.8740 QUTE D’EQUILIBRE 0
MARCHANDISE EN SURPLUS 15 / 21 DEMANDE NON
SATISFAITE 17 / 23
TAUX DE SATIETE DU MARCHE 20.00%
The "état des patrimoines" presents each agent by his rank number. We can find his status too (buyer ACH,
seller VEN, and out of the market XXX). We find then, his mind price as buyer or as seller, his negociation margin,
his liquid assets, the number of his partners and, his satisfaction index.
